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Deutsch on the Epistemic Problem in Everettian Quantum Theory 
Leeds University 
David Deutsch (forthcoming) offers a solution to the Epistemic Problem for Everettian Quantum 
Theory. In this note I raise some problems for the attempted solution. 
 Everettian Quantum Theory is deterministic  ? it says that when a quantum measurement is 
made, the laboratory, scientists and entire world split into branches, and for each possible result, 
there is a branch where that result occurs. The big problem for Everettian Quantum Theory is how to 
make sense of what other versions of quantum theory identify as objective probabilities. These 
equations match our observations; if quantum mechanics says a result has a probability of 1/3, then 
repeated experiments show the result, on average, one time in three. 
 There are two roles for probability that we have to make sense of:  
 
The Practical Problem: How are we rationally to act, if we interpret quantum 
mechanics along Everettian lines? Suppose we are faced with a choice between, 
say, disaster on the spin-up branch and disaster on the spin-down branch. Given 
only that, whichever choice we make, there will be a disaster branch and a non-
disaster branch, how could we ever have grounds for choosing? 
 
The Epistemic Problem: How can we justify believing the theory on the basis of 
our empirical evidence, if we interpret quantum mechanics along Everettian lines? 
Given only that the theory predicted that the evidence that we have in fact 
observed would occur on some branch (and that the same is true of every other 
 ‘ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ƐƚƌŝŶŐŽĨĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?ŚŽǁĐĂŶǁĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇƚĂŬĞ ŽƵƌĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŽĐŽŶĨŝƌŵ
the theory? (Greaves 2007 p. 122)  
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Our focus will be the epistemic problem, but let me first note that Deutsch's proposal for the epistemic 
problem relies in part on the "decision-theoretic" approach to the practical problem (Deutsch 1999), 
so if the decision-theoretic approach is invalid, Deutsch's proposal for the epistemic problem 
presumably can't get off the ground. Ƶƚ ůĞƚ ?ƐƐĞƚƚŚŝƐĂƐŝĚĞ  ?I tŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶŐƌĂŶƚŝŶŐĞƵƚƐĐŚ ?Ɛ
solution to the practical problem, his attempt to solve the epistemic problem fails. 
 ^ŽůĞƚ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĞƉŝstemic problem. The standard Bayesian theory of confirmation says 
that: 
 
F confirms H iff P(F|H) > P(F)1  
 
What is our evidence according to Everettian Quantum Theory? As all results happen, it seems that all 
results have a probability of 1 i.e. P(F|H) = 1. On minimal assumptions2, it follows that P(F|H) > P(F), 
therefore the evidence is guaranteed to confirm H, whatever evidence is found. And this confirmation 
seems to be too easy. ^ŽƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŝƐŶŽƚƐŽŵƵĐŚ ‘how can we reasonably take our evidence to 
ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? ?ďƵƚmust we always take our evidence to confirm the theory? How can we avoid 
easy confirmation? This is the epistemic problem. 
Deutsch (forthcoming) suggests an answer to this problem. Before getting to the details of his 
account, we should make explicit one of the interesting features of his approach. He rejects 
probabilistic theories of cŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨĂWŽƉƉĞƌŝĂŶƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ZŽƵŐŚůǇ ?ŽŶĞƵƚƐĐŚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?
scientific theories are explanations, and a theory should be rejected when it fails to explain an 
explicanda and a competing explanation succeeds in explaining the explicanda. 
Popperian theories deny the existence of inductive probabilities, which is both their strength 
and weakness. It is a strength because attempts to construct inductive probabilities are deemed to 
                                                          
1 I assume that 0 < P(H) < 1, which ensures the inequality in the text is equivalent to the more standard P(H|F) 
> P(H). See Salmon (1975) and Fitelson & Hájek (forthcoming). / ?ǀĞĂůƐŽĐŚĂŶŐĞĚthe ŵŽƌĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ‘ ?ƚŽ ‘& ?ƚŽ
ĂǀŽŝĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĞƵƚƐĐŚ ?Ɛ ‘ ?ĨŽƌ ‘ǀĞƌĞƚƚ ?ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? ? 
2 Namely, assuming that 0 < P(H) < 1 and 0 < P(F) < 1, and that E confirms H iff P(H|F) > P(H). 
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have failed. It is a weakness because without inductive probabilities we can say so little about scientific 
theories  ? we cannot say that a theory is confirmed, or should be believed to any degree. The 
Popperian can be thought of as being especially epistemically cautious  ? even if a theory has survived 
attempts to refute it, we should still not believe it. Perhaps this is a price worth paying in order to 
avoid error. But there ŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƐƚƌĂŶŐĞĂďŽƵƚĞƵƚƐĐŚ ?ƐĂƉƉĞĂůƚŽWŽƉƉĞƌ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŚĞƌĞ ?  
Deutsch suggests that Popperian methodology can solve a problem  ? the epistemic problem 
in Everettian Quantum Theory  ? that Bayesian theories cannot. ŶĚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƐĞĞŚŽǁĂŶǇƉƌŽďůĞŵĐŽƵůĚ
be solved by Popper and not also solved by the Bayesian. For Bayesian theories are naturally thought 
of as logical strengthenings of WŽƉƉĞƌ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ? WŽƉƉĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ĐůĂŝŵ  ? that theories are 
rejected when falsifying evidence is found  ? can be incorporated into Bayesian methodology  ? as the 
claim that H is rejected when E is found such that P(E|H) =0.3  ĞƵƚƐĐŚ ?Ɛ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌning 
understanding scientific theories as explanations can also be incorporated into Bayesian methodology. 
Bayesian theories add inductive or subjective probabilities, allowing them to make further claims, such 
as that a hypothesis is confirmed by the evidence in non-extreme cases. And this addition can only 
add to the power of the theory. So it seems that anything that can be explained by Popperian 
methodology can also be explained by Bayesian methodology. So if the Popperian can explain how to 
update in an Everettian world, then the Bayesian should be able to as well, by applying the Popperian 
bit of their theory. 
Ƶƚ ůĞƚ ?Ɛ ƐĞƚ ƚŚŝƐworry ĂƐŝĚĞ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ĞƵƚƐĐŚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?He argues that there can be 
evidence that is not explained by Everettian Quantum Theory that is explained by a competitor.  
He first lays the groundwork by making the following claim about explanation: 
 
Criterion (i): ĂŶĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŝƐďĂĚ QƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ Q ?ŝ ?ŝƚƐĞĞŵƐŶŽƚƚo account 
for its explicanda Q4 
                                                          
3 Compare Howson and Urbach 1993, pp. 119 
4 KƚŚĞƌĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂĂƌĞĂĚĚĞĚďƵƚǁĞǁŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŚĞŵ ? 
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So if we are trying to explain something, say, a1 (the explicanda), then an explanation is bad to the 
extent that it seems not to account for a1. KŶĞŵŝŐŚƚǁŽŶĚĞƌǁŚĂƚƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨŽƌ ?. Why not just say that an explanation is bad to the extent that it fails to explain its 
explicanda? ĞƵƚƐĐŚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƚĞůůƵƐ ?ĂŶĚ/ǁŝůůĂƌŐƵĞůĂƚĞƌƚŚĂƚ ?ŝ ?ŵĞƌĞůǇůĞĂĚƐƵƐƌŽƵŶĚŝŶĂĐŝƌĐůĞ ? But 
ůĞƚ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐŽŶ ? 
Deutsch then describes the following example: 
 
Suppose...that two mutually inconsistent theories, D and E, are good explanations 
of a certain class of explicanda, including all known results of relevant experiments, 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽŶůǇƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚĞŝƚŚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŵďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?
Suppose also that in regard to a particular proposed experiment, E makes only the 
everything-possible-ŚĂƉƉĞŶƐƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ QĨŽƌƌĞƐƵůƚƐĂ ? ?Ă ? ? Q ?ǁŚŝůĞƉƌĞĚŝĐƚƐĂ
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƌĞƐƵůƚĂ ? Q 
KďƐĞƌǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚĂ ? QǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨďŽƚŚand E. 
Even so, it would be a new explicandum which, by criterion (i) above, would raise 
a problem for the explanation E, since why the result a1 was observed but the 
ŽƚŚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇďƵƚƵŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇ ? 
 
But why doesŶ͛ƚ E explain the result a1? Indeed, E says that all possible results will be observed, so it 
says that a1 will be observed. So E does seem to explain a1 being observed. This is the heart of the 
problem. Deutsch needs to tell us how E fails to explain the result Ă ? ?/ ?ŵnot saying this cannot be 
done, just that Deutsch has not told us how. Why might E fail to explain a1? Perhaps we need to take 
into account that result a1 is observed only by agents on the a1 branch. Agents on other branches do 
not see a1, they observe a different result. Perhaps these other observations are not explained by E. 
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But Deutsch makes no mention of these post-measurement branches. Instead, he uses his 
proposed scientific methodology to tell us why E fails to explain a1. But I find his scientific 
methodology unilluminating. In fact he seems to lead us round a string of definitions. 
 Deutsch tells us that, given E, a1 is expected not to happen, even though it will happen: 
 
under E5 Qa1 is expected not to happen, in the sense defined in Section 2 [see 
below], even though E asserts that, like every other [result], it will happen... This is 
no contradiction. Being expected is a methodological attribute of a possible result 
(depending, for instance, on whether a good explanation for it exists) while 
happening is a factual one. What is at issue in this paper is not whether the 
ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ‘ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚŶŽƚƚŽŚĂƉƉĞŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǁŝůůŚĂƉƉĞŶ ?ĂƌĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚďƵƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ
they can both follow from the same deterministic explanatory theory, in this case 
E, under a reasonable scientific methodology. And I have just shown that they can. 
 
So Deutsch claims he has shown that, given E, a result both will happen and is expected not to happen. 
It is not clear to me that he has shown this. /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŚŽǁŝƚŝƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? 
 Quick clarification: There is usually nothing inconsistent with a result being expected not to 
happen and also happening. Every time you are surprised, something happened that you expected 
not to. Deustch is defending the consistency of a scenario much stranger than this. For according to E, 
a1 is guaranteed to happen. So Deutsch is defending the consistency of a theory which says that both 
a1 is guaranteed to happen and that a1 is not expected to happen. 
 DeƵƚƐĐŚĚŽĞƐŐŝǀĞƵƐƐŽŵĞŚĞůƉďǇĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐǁŚĂƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐďǇ ‘ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ?ĞĂƌůŝĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ, 
in the advertised Section 2: 
 
                                                          
5 Deutsch adds a striŶŐŽĨĂ ?ƌĞƐƵůƚƐŚĞƌĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƐĞĞŵ to play an essential role in his argument. 
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/ŶŽǁĚĞĨŝŶĞĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŶŽƚŝŽŶ QŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƚŵĞĂŶƐĨŽƌĂƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚƚŽ
be expected to have a result x under an explanatory theory T. It means that if the 
experiment were performed and did not result in x, T would become (more) 
problematic. Expectation is thus defined in terms of problems, and problems in 
terms of explanation, of which we shall need only the properties (i)... 
 
How ĞǆĂĐƚůǇ ĂƌĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĞƵƚƐĐŚ ŝƐŶ ?ƚ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ? ,ŝƐ(i) doesŶ ?ƚ
ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶ ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?6 But (i) tells us when an explanation is bad (i.e. when it seems not to account for 
its explicanda), and presumably a bad explanation is an expůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?^ŽĞƵƚƐĐŚ ?Ɛ
reasoning seems to be that a1 is expected not to happen according to E because a1 raises a problem 
for E; and a1 raises a problem for E because E seems not to account for a1.  
Ƶƚ ǁŚǇ ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ  ƐĞĞŵ ƚŽaccount for a1? Indeed, E says that all possible results will be 
observed, so it says that a1 will be observed. So E does seem to account for a1 being observed. This is 
ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉƌŽďůĞŵǁĞƌĂŶŝŶƚŽĂďŽǀĞ ?ǁŝƚŚ ‘ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨŽƌ ? ?^ŽƚŚĞ string of 
definitions does not seem to have helped.7 
It might be useful to quickly run through the dialectic. Deutsch said that E, the theory 
according to which everything possible happens, fails to explain a1. The objector points out that E says 
that a1 will happen, and asks why E fails to explain a1. Deutsch replies that E fails to explain a1 because 
E fails to account for a1. The objector then asks why E fails to account for a1. And no answer seems to 
be given.   
Deutsch ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŝƐĂďŝƚŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĂŶ ŵǇĞǆƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞĞǆƚƌĂ
ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚŝĞƐŚĞůƉ ?/ ?ůůŵĞŶƚŝŽŶƚǁŽƐƵĐŚĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?&ŝƌƐƚ ?ĞƵƐƚĐŚŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƐĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
a methodological attribute of a possible result and a factual one, in order to make sense of how a 
result can be expected not to occur even though it is guaranteed to occur. ,ĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞŽŶ
                                                          
6 Nor do (ii) or (iii). 
7 /ŶĨĂĐƚǁĞŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞƐƚŽƉƉĞĚĂƐƚĞƉĞĂƌůŝĞƌ ?dŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?
ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ‘ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ůĞĂǀĞƐƵƐǁŽŶĚĞƌŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶǁŚǇĨĂŝůƐƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶa1. 
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what he means by this distinction. A factual attribute of a result seems fairly clear  ? it is a matter of 
whether the result occurs or not. What is a methodological attribute? It seems to be a matter of 
whether the result is expected to happen. But if so, we just have the problem re-phrased in new 
terminology. And anyway, it seems to be the wrong kind of distinction to solve the problem. I could 
imagine this distinction solving the problem if methodological attributes and factual attributes were 
probabilistically independent. Then a result being guaranteed to happen (factual) would have no 
relevance to whether it was expected to happen (methodological). But sƵƌĞůǇ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞŶ ?ƚ
probabilistically independent  ? methodological attributes such as being expected to happen are surely 
relevant to the factual attribute of whether it does happen. The greater the expectation 
(methodological), the greater the probability of it happening (factual). 
I suspect Deutsch would reject the use of probability in the last sentence, as his scientific 
methodology ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƵƐĞŝŶĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƵƚǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽƵƐĞŝŶĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ
to Deutsch, for he is only concerned with a case at the limit, where the probability is 1. Everettian 
Quantum Theory says that a1 is guaranteed to happen i.e. probability 1 (factual). And surely this is 
probabilistically relevant to whether it is expected to happen (methodological). To the extent that 
ĞƵƚƐĐŚĚĞŶŝĞƐƚŚŝƐ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐďy  ‘ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ? ?dŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚǁŝůůƌĞƚƵƌŶŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǆƚ
paragraph. 
A second complication is that Deutsch talks about a series of results of a1, and claims that this 
series of results would be explained by D, but not by E. dŚŝƐŵĂŬĞƐĞƵƚƐĐŚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚƚůĞŵŽƌĞ
intuitive at first. If we got a string of a1 results, we might be inclined to think that D is true and E is 
false. But remember that E says that everything will happen  ? including the string of a1 results. This 
perhaps draws attention to the fact that it is unclear what we should expect to see if Everettian 
Quantum Theory is true. Everettian Quantum Theory says that all possible results happen, but it 
ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƐĂǇƚŚĂƚǁĞǁŝůůsee all possible results happen. It says a1 will happen, but not that 
we will see a1. Indeed, we know that we wŽŶ ?ƚƐĞĞĂůůƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐ in any normal sense  ? the agent 
on the a1 branch sees a1, the agent on the a2 branch sees a2, and so on. Deutsch goes further  ? saying 
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that Everettian Quantum Theory says we should not expect to see a1, nor a string of a1 results (at 
least if there is another theory D that does predict a1). But what should we expect to see according to 
Everettian Quantum Theory? This remains mysterious  ? ŝĨ ‘ǁĞ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽŽƵƌƉƌĞ-branching selves then 
ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌƐ ǁŚŽ ƐĞĞ Ă ? ĂŶĚ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌƐ ǁŚŽ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ? WůĂƵƐŝďůǇ ? ǁŚĞŶ ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ
successors there is a break-down in our usual way of answering questions about what we should 
expect to see. A problem for Deutsch is that his answer relies on judgments about what we should 
expect to see. Without being told more about how Deutsch is thinking about what we should expect 
to see, it is difficult to understand his answer. 
Finally let me make a couple of points ĂďŽƵƚ ĞƵƚƐĐŚ ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ŽĨ ƐƚŽĐŚĂƐƚŝĐ ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ?
Deutsch's methodology rules out stochastic theories as fundamental explanations, but accepts them 
as useful approximations. He points out, I think correctly, that making use of stochastic theories 
requires adopting something like the following principle:  
 
(3) If a theory attaches numbers pi to possible results ai of an experiment; and calls 
ƚŚŽƐĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐ ‘ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚŝĨ ? in one or more instances of the experiment; 
the observed frequencies of the ai differ significantly; according to some statistical 
test; from the pi; then a scientific problem should be deemed to exist. p.5 
 
But Deutsch rejects (3). His reasons are hard to follow. He first points out that (3) is normative, and so 
not a law of nature. Granted. He goes on: 
 
Nor, on the other hand, could it be appended to the explanatory scientific 
methodology I am advocating, for then it would be purely ad hoc: scientific 
methodology should be about whether reality seems to conform to our 
explanations; there is a problem when it does not, and only then. And one cannot 
make an explanation problematic merely by declaring it so.  (Italics original) p.6 
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But surely (3) describes a scenario where reality fails to conform to our explanations. The theory would 
explain results ai with frequencies pi; and if the frequencies of ai differed significantly from pi then 
reality would fail to conform to the explanation. The final italicized sentence is confusing. Of course it 
is correct that one cannot make an explanation problematic merely by declaring it so. But we are not 
attempting to make an explanation problematic by declaring it so  ? we are attempting to say what it 
is for an explanation to be problematic. Indeed, this is surely part of what Deutsch himself is doing 
with (i). 
 KŶĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĞƵƚƐĐŚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƐƚŽĐŚĂƐƚŝĐƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŝƐǁŽƌƚŚŵĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ  ? he 
seems to assume that the world is deterministic. He rejects the possible methodology for stochastic 
theories discussed above, and argues that ǁĞĐĂŶƵƐĞƐƚŽĐŚĂƐƚŝĐƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽŶůǇǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞ ‘ŝƐĂŐŽŽĚ
ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌǁŚǇŽŶĞĐĂŶĞǆƉĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨ ƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůƚŽďĞƵŶĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚďǇ ?(p.6) 
replacing an awkward or intractable property with the mathematical property of randomness. And he 
menƚŝŽŶƐ ‘a game where the dice were replaced by a generator of random numbers  ? even though 
the latter is physically impossible ? ?(Italics added) p.6 
Deutsch may be of the solid conviction that God does not play dice, but one should not make 
this assumption in the debate about interpretations of quantum mechanics ?ǁŚĞƌĞŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌůŽĐƵƚŽƌƐ
will disagree. And even if we do agree that God does not play dice, we can still ask the question of 
what our methodology should be (or should have been) if he did. Could we possibly find evidence that 
would lead us to believe that the world is indeterministic? In rejecting a methodology for stochastic 
theories, Deutsch suggests a negative answer to this question too, but the arguments given leave 
things very much open.8 
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